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What Should We Do About Administrative Law 
Judge Disability Decisionmaking? 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1 
 
The Scope and Sources of the Problem 
 
 The 1400 Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who work for the Social Security 
Administration (SSA)2 are making a significant contribution to the economic problems 
the US is now experiencing. When an applicant for Social Security disability benefits 
receives two negative decisions from the SSA, he can appeal to an ALJ. Over the past 
four decades, the proportion of the US population that has been determined to be 
permanently disabled has more than doubled.3 The cost of the disability program has 
increased over four-fold over the past two decades.4 During that period, the cost of 
disability benefit awards increased from 10 per cent of SSA’s total budget to 18 per cent 
of that budget.5 Annual payments from the trust fund that was established to pay 
disability benefits are now $124 billion dollars—one per cent of total US GDP.6 As a 
                                                 
1 Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am indebted to Rob Glicksman, 
Jerry Mashaw, and the participants in a works in progress luncheon at George Washington University for 
providing helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. I am also indebted to Autumn Houston for 
providing research assistance on this project. 
2 U.S. Social Securty Administration, ALJ Disposition Data.  Fiscal Year 2011, 
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.pdf. 
3U.S. Social Securty Administration, Office of Policy, Trends in the Social Security and Supplemental 
Security Income Disability Programs, 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/disability_trends/sect01.html.  
4 Id. See also Congressional Budget Office, Social Security Disability Insurance: Participation Rates and 
Their Fiscal Implications (July 2010); David Autor & Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security 
Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J.Econ. Perspectives 71 (2006).   
5 Id. 
6 U.S. Social Security Administration, Trustees 2011 Report Summary, Actuarial Publications, Status of the 
Social Security and Medicare Programs, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/index.html. 
 1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890770
result, that fund is expected to be exhausted by 2018, many years before the expected 
exhaustion of the Social Security or Medicare trust funds.7  
 The large increase in the proportion of the US population that has been 
determined to be permanently disabled is also having broader adverse effects on the 
performance of the US economy. The proportion of US adult males who are available for 
work has declined from 80 per cent in 1970 to 71 per cent in 2010.8 As The Economist 
has documented “Widespread male worklessness has huge economic, fiscal, and social 
costs.”9             
Most of the increase in the proportion of the population that has been determined 
to be permanently disabled is attributable to ALJ decisions that reversed initial SSA 
decisions that denied applications for benefits on the basis of determinations that the 
applicants were not disabled. Thus, for instance, a single SSA ALJ overruled SSA and 
awarded benefits to 2285 applicants in 2007, at a cost to taxpayers of $2.1 billion.10 
Unless we address this problem promptly and effectively, it will increase in severity and 
scope. As the tendency of ALJs to grant benefits that SSA twice denied has become well-
known, there has been a predictable increase in the number of applications for benefits.  
                                                 
7Id. 
8 Marlene A. Lee and Mark Mather, U.S. Labor Force Trends, POPULATION BULLETIN, Vol. 63, No. 2, 
(June 2008), http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.2uslabor.pdf.; Bureau of Labor Statistics, International 
Comparisons of Annual Labor Force Statistics 31 (Mar. 30, 2011).  
9 America’s Jobless Men: Decline of the Working Man, The Economist (Apr. 28, 2011). This article was 
part of a series of articles in which The Economist has linked excess disability payments to the poor 
performance of the US economy. See, e.g., Disability Payments: The Elephant in the Waiting Room, The 
Economist (Mar. 10, 2011); Unemployment: Which Workers Will Need Jobs, The Economist (Sep. 14, 
2010); America’s Labor Market: Something’s Not Working, The Economist (Apr. 29, 2010).    
10 Mark Friesen, Paying Out Billions, One Judge Attracts Criticism, The Oregonian (Dec. 29, 2008);The 
Oregonian, Social Security Database, (Friday, June 18, 
2010)http://www.oregonlive.com/special/index.ssf/2008/12/social_security_database.html (last visited July 
11, 2011).  
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In 2008 alone, the number of applications increased by 21 per cent, to 2.8 
million,11 and the backlog of cases pending before ALJs reached 752,000.12  The number 
of decisions granting benefits increased 28 per cent between 2007 and 2010.13 Since the 
average cost of a decision granting disability benefits is $245,000,14 and ALJs grant 
benefits in 60% of cases,15 the total cost of the pending cases alone will be about $117 
billion. As a practical matter, ALJ decisions that grant disability benefits are final and 
irrevocable commitments of taxpayer funds. SSA lacks the resources to review ALJ 
decisions that grant benefits,16and less than one per cent of individuals who are awarded 
benefits ever leave the rolls of beneficiaries.17 
If there was reason to believe that all, or even most, ALJ decisions granting 
disability benefits were accurate reflections of the health status of the individual 
applicants, I would reluctantly accept the high cost of those decisions as one of the costs 
of living in a humane and compassionate country. There is no reason to indulge that 
belief, however, and there are many reasons to reject it as highly unlikely. 
First, most of the applicants who are awarded benefits by ALJs are determined by 
the ALJ to have a “nonexertional restriction” – either a mental condition such as anxiety 
or depression or pain attributable to a musculoskeletal condition.18 Thus, for instance, 
                                                 
11 U.S. Social Security Administration, Selected Data from Social Security's Disability Program, Disabled-
Worker Statistics, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.html.   
12U.S. Social Security Administration, Plan to Eliminate the Hearing Backlog and Prevent Its Recurrence, 
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2008, 
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/Backlog_Reports/Annual_Backlog_Report_FY_2008-Jan.pdf.    
13 Id.  
14 Autor & Duggan, note 4, supra. at 73.   
15 U.S. Social Security Administration, ALJ Disposition Data.  Fiscal Year 2011, 
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.pdf. 
16 CBO, supra. note 4, at 6.  
17 Id. at 4. 
18 Jon Dubin discusses this phenomenon at length in Jon Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell and 
Bureaucratically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security Administration’s 
Disability Programs, 62 Admin. L. Rev. 937, 942-47 (2010). See also    
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between 1983 and 2003, awards based on nonexertional restrictions increased 323 per 
cent; by 2003, they accounted for over half of all awards.19  Nonexertional restrictions 
have characteristics that are important in evaluating disability decisions. There are no 
objective diagnostic criteria that can be used to verify or refute a claim that an individual 
has a nonexertional restriction.20 Moreover, all such restrictions are matters of degree. 
The Social Security Act renders an individual eligible for disability benefits only if he has 
an impairment “of such severity that he  .  .  .  cannot   .   .   .   engage in any   .   .   .  kind 
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”21 Yet, there are no 
objective diagnostic criteria that can be used to measure the degree of an applicant’s 
anxiety, depression, or pain.22 Finally, nonexertional restrictions are ubiquitous. The 
National Institute of Medicine has found that 116,000,000 americans suffer from chronic 
pain,23 while the National Institute of Mental Health has found that 61,000,000 americans 
suffer from mentqal disease.24 It is a rare person who reaches my age (68) without having 
experienced anxiety, depression, and/or pain over some significant periods of time. Thus, 
at some point in his life, almost every person can make a plausible claim of eligibility for 
permanent disability benefits based on nonexertional restrictions. That claim can neither 
be supported nor refuted based on application of objective diagnostic criteria   
Second, the patterns of ALJ decisions granting or denying disability benefits vary 
greatly among ALJs. Studies of ALJ disability decisionmaking have documented massive 
unexplained differences in the rate at which ALJs grant or deny benefits. Thus, for 
                                                 
19 Autor & Duggan, supra. note 4, at 79. 
20 Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of Pain 51-58, 81-87 (1986); Jerry Mashaw, Bureaucratic 
Justice 52-64, 61-64, 110  (1983); Jerry Mashaw, Charles Goetz, Frank Goodman, Warren Schwartz, Paul 
Verkuil, and Milton Carrow, Social Security Hearings and Appeals 15-19,101-109,139 (1978).   
21 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). 
22 See sources cited in note 20 supra. 
23 National Institute of Medicine, Relieving Pain in America (2011). 
24 National Institute of Mental Health website (last visited on July 18, 2011). 
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instance, a study of ALJ decisions made in 1976 found that, while 45% of ALJs granted 
benefits in 40 to 60% of cases, 12% granted benefits in less than 28% of cases and 10% 
granted benefits in over 72% of cases.25 Given the large number of cases randomly 
assigned to each ALJ, variations of that magnitude can only be explained as a reflection 
of the widely differing attitudes of ALJs.26 As a team of six scholars concluded in 1978: 
“the outcome of cases depends more on who decides the case than on what the facts 
are.”27     
The variation in the decisionmaking patterns of ALJs has increased significantly 
since the 1970s. In the first half of 2011, for instance, the average rate at which ALJs 
awarded benefits was 60%,28 but 100 ALJs awarded benefits in over 90% of cases29 
while 27 ALJs awarded benefits in over 95% of cases.30 That dramatic difference in grant 
rates is inherently inconsistent with an accurate decisionmaking process. 
Third, the temporal pattern of ALJ disability decisions is inconsistent with a belief 
in the accuracy of those decisions. Both the average ALJ grant rate and the distribution of 
ALJ grant rates have increased dramatically over the past three decades.31 The net effect 
has been a doubling of the proportion of the population that has been determined to be 
permanently disabled. If ALJ disability decisions are an accurate reflection of the health 
of the US population, we are experiencing a public health crisis. If we are to believe ALJ 
                                                 
25 Mashaw et al., supra. note 20 ,at 21-24.  
26 Richard Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking, 57 U.Chi. L. 
Rev. 481, 509 (1990). 
27 Mashaw et al. supra. note 20, at xxi.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Compare the chart in Mashaw et al, supra. note 20, at 21, with the chart in Social Security Advisory 
Board, Improving the Social Security Administration’s Hearing Process 5 (2006).   
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decisions, the incidence of permanent disability in the US population has more than 
doubled since 1970.32 That belief is beyond implausible.       
Fourth, every case in which an ALJ grants disability benefits is a case in which 
the SSA bureaucracy has twice determined that the applicant is not disabled.33 The initial 
bureaucratic decision is made by a team that consists of a disability examiner and a 
medical advisor. The team analyzes the paper record, including the submissions of the 
applicant and the applicant’s treating physicians. The decisionmaking team can solicit 
such additional medical information as it determines to be needed to complete the record 
and can order such further examinations by consultative physicians as it determines to be 
needed to make an accurate determination of disability. If the initial team of 
decisionmakers denies the application, the applicant can request and obtain a second 
determination by a new examiner/medical advisor team. The new team can, and often 
does, order additional consultative examinations. SSA implements a quality assurance 
program in which it evaluates the decisions of the examiner/medical advisor teams to 
ensure the accuracy of their decisions and to provide feedback and training to disability 
examiners and medical advisors to the extent that the quality assurance office identifies 
flaws or gaps in the decisionmaking process. 
If both the first examiner/medical advisor team and the second examiner/medical 
advisor team find that the applicant is not disabled, the applicant can obtain a de novo 
oral hearing before an ALJ. The applicant can be, and usually is, represented by counsel 
                                                 
32 U.S. Social Securty Administration, Office of Policy, Trends in the Social Security and Supplemental 
Security Income Disability Programs, 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/disability_trends/sect01.html. 
33 The decisionmaking process is described in Robert Glicksman & Richard Levy, Administrative Law: 
Agency Action in Legal Context 581-82 (2010). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 337 (1976).    
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at that hearing.34 The government is never represented at a hearing before an ALJ. The 
only government employee at the hearing is the ALJ, who has a duty to assist the 
applicant in the development of evidence in support of his claim.35 If the ALJ finds that 
the applicant is disabled, that decision is final as a practical matter.  In theory, SSA can 
review an ALJ decision that grants an application for benefits, but its past efforts to do so 
have been thwarted by a combination of judicial resistance and inadequate funding.36 
The decision to allow an applicant to appeal two negative decisions made by two 
examiner/medical advisor teams to an ALJ and to allow an ALJ’s decision to grant an 
application for benefits that has been rejected twice by the bureaucracy to become final 
must be based on the belief that ALJ decisions are more likely to be accurate than 
decisions made by two independent examiner/medical advisor teams. There is no basis 
for that belief, however, and many reasons for the contrary belief. The ALJ has no 
medical education and, unlike a disability examiner, the ALJ has no medical advisor. 
Moreover, unlike the examiner/medical advisor teams, the ALJ’s decisionmaking process 
is not subject to any form of evaluation or other means of assuring the quality of the 
decisionmaking process. SSA is prohibited from supervising ALJs or evaluating their 
performance,37 and SSA’s past efforts to implement quality assurance programs 
applicable to ALJs have been abandoned as a result of hostility from district courts and 
lack of adequate resources.38 
                                                 
34 Autor & Duggan, note 4 supra., at 88.  
35 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512 (d), 416.912(d-f). 
36 See text at notes 63-68 infra.  
37 5 U.S.C. §4301(2)(D); 5 C.F.R. §930.211. See the detailed discussion in Paul Verkuil, Daniel Gifford, 
Charles Koch, Jeffrey Lubbers & Richard Pierce, The Federal Administrative Judiciary 133-62 (1992).    
38 See text at notes 71-81 infra. 
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The belief that ALJ decisions are more likely to be accurate than bureaucratic 
decisions must be based on the belief that oral hearings yield more accurate findings of 
fact than decisions based on paper hearings. That belief, in turn, must be based primarily 
on the belief that the ability to observe the demeanor of a witness helps a decisionmaker 
determine whether the witness is providing honest and accurate testimony. That belief is 
longstanding, but it is supported by no evidence, and it is contradicted by a large body of 
evidence in the psychology literature.39          
The Executive Branch of government is powerless to address the growing 
problem of ALJs’ unwarranted commitment of billions of dollars to undeserving 
applicants for disability benefits. On May 19, 2011, The Wall Street Journal published a 
front page article in which it focused attention on an ALJ who had awarded benefits in 
100% of the 729 cases he decided in the first six months of fiscal 2011 and in 1280 of the 
1284 cases he decided in 2010.40 It quoted the Commissioner of Social Security: “We 
mostly have a very productive judiciary that makes high-quality decisions, and we’ve got 
some outliers and we’ve done what we can. Our hands are tied on some of the more 
extreme cases.”41 A week later, the Commissioner apparently changed his views and 
attempted to address the problem that the Journal highlighted. SSA suspended the ALJ 
indefinitely.42 
There are two problems with the SSA response to the problem. First, it is patently 
inadequate. The problem is not limited to one or even a few outliers. Many ALJs grant 
                                                 
39 Richard Lempert, Samuel Gross, James Liebman, John Blume, Stephen Landsman & Frederick Lederer, 
A Modern Approach to Evidence 526-27 (4th ed. 2011); Olin Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 Corn. L. Rev. 1075, 
1078-91 (1991). 
40 Damien Paletta, Disability-Claim Judge Has Trouble Saying ‘No’ Wall Street Journal (May 19, 2011).    
41 Id. 
42 Damien Paletta, Disability Judge Put on Leave from Post, Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2011). 
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benefits at indefensibly high rates.43 Second, the SSA action against the ALJ is not within 
SSA’s power to take. An agency can take an action of any type against an ALJ, 
specifically including suspension, only if it persuades another ALJ at the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB) that it has “good cause” to take the action.44 That is extremely 
difficult in general and impossible in a context in which the ALJ’s pattern of decisions is 
the putative basis for the removal attempt. 
A case that the Federal Circuit decided in 2011 illustrates the difficulty of the task 
of removing an ALJ even in extreme circumstances.45 An SSA ALJ beat his domestic 
partner and his young child.46 The two victims fled to the house of friends, who called 
the police.47 The police took pictures of the damage to the faces of the victims and 
charged the ALJ with battery.48 SSA filed a petition with MSPB in which it sought to 
remove the ALJ for good cause.49 MSPB assigned the case to another ALJ. The presiding 
ALJ found that the defendant ALJ had not beaten his child and had not struck his 
domestic partner with his fist.50 The presiding ALJ stated that he believed the testimony 
of the defendant ALJ and disbelieved the testimony of the several witnesses who testified 
for SSA.51 On review of the ALJ’s initial decision, MSPB issued an opinion in which it 
found that the defendant ALJ had hit his child and hit his domestic partner with his fist. 
MSPB then held that the ALJ could be removed for good cause.52 
                                                 
43 Text at notes 28-31 supra. 
44 5 U.S.C. §7521.  
45 Long v. Social Security Administration, 635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
46 Id. at 528. 
47 Id. at 528. 
48 Id. at 528. 
49 Id. at 528-29. 
50 Id. at 529. 
51 Id. at 529. 
52 Id. at 529. 
 9
The presiding ALJ based his findings of fact on his observation of the demeanor 
of the witnesses.53 That was an obvious attempt to insulate his findings and his decision 
from potential reversal by MSPB. The Administrative Procedure Act gives an agency the 
power to reject an initial decision of an ALJ on appeal. Specifically, the APA provides: 
“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all of the powers which 
it would have in making the initial decision.”54 The Supreme Court has interpreted that 
provision to allow an agency to replace the findings of fact made by an ALJ with the 
agency’s own findings of facts inconsistent with those of the ALJ as long as the agency’s 
findings are supported by substantial evidence.55 Like most circuit courts, however, the 
Federal Circuit has qualified the APA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA 
in the context of findings based on demeanor. Under Federal Circuit precedent, when an 
ALJ makes findings based on demeanor, an agency can substitute its findings for those of 
the ALJ only by satisfying an unusually demanding duty to explain its action.56 
Courts have long attached great significance to the ability of a trier of facts to 
observe a witness’s demeanor. That judicial tradition is not supported by any evidence, 
however. Indeed, there is a substantial body of research that has consistently concluded 
that observation of a witness’s demeanor is not at all helpful in determining whether a 
witness is providing honest and accurate testimony.57 
The Federal Circuit upheld the MSPB decision that rejected the presiding ALJ’s 
findings of fact and upheld the agency’s decision to remove the ALJ for good cause.58 
                                                 
53 Id. at 530. 
54 5 U.S.C. §557(b). 
55 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
56 Leatherby v. Dep’t of the Army, 524 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
57 Sources in note 39, supra. 
58 635 F.3d at 530-31. 
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The court concluded that MSPB had met its burden of explaining adequately why it 
rejected the presiding ALJ’s findings of fact. One judge wrote a concurring opinion, 
however, in which he expressed concern about the MSPB’s basis for its findings and 
suggested that he would have decided the case for the defendant ALJ in another case that 
did not involve facts that were so “unusual.”59  It seems highly unlikely that the court 
would uphold an MSPB decision removing an ALJ for good cause in the much less 
“unusual” case of an ALJ who has granted benefits in all, or virtually all, of the cases he 
has decided. Indeed, most courts have reacted with hostility to more subtle SSA attempts 
to exercise any degree of control over the decisionmaking patterns of ALJs.60        
                                                                                                    
Potential Solutions 
 
A. Require employers to share the cost of disability decisions  
 
 There are many directions we could take in an effort to address this problem. 
Some scholars urge adoption of the approach that seems to be yielding improvements in 
the Netherlands. Dutch law now requires that an applicant’s employer pay part of the 
costs of providing disability benefits for the initial years a beneficiary receives benefits.61 
By requiring employers to bear that cost, the Dutch system gives employers incentives to 
                                                 
59 Id. at 538-39. 
60 Text at notes 71-81 infra. 
61 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Sickness and Disability Schemes in the 
Netherlands, (November 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/30/41429917.pdf. 
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accommodate an individual’s disabilities in various ways, to provide an individual with 
training that will enable him to perform another job that is within his new more limited 
capabilities, and to contest an individual’s claim of disability.  
This option may be worth consideration in the U.S. I do not know how much 
employers can do to discourage potential applicants from seeking disability benefits 
through accommodation or assistance, but I am confident that giving employers an 
incentive to contest an applicant’s claim in a proceeding before an ALJ would reduce the 
number of cases in which ALJs grant benefits to undeserving applicants. At present, 
when an applicant appears before an ALJ, he is usually represented by a lawyer who can 
earn as much as $6000 if he can persuade the ALJ to grant his client benefits.62 The ALJ, 
in turn, has a duty to assist the applicant in gathering and presenting the evidence 
required to determine whether he is disabled. No one represents the agency or the 
taxpayer in disability proceedings before an ALJ. If employers were required to bear a 
significant share of the total cost of a grant of disability benefits, they would be likely to 
retain lawyers to contest applications by employees they believe to be undeserving and 
the presence of lawyers opposing undeserving applicants would change the outcome of 
many cases. As the proportion cases in which applicants succeeded in proceedings before 
ALJs declined, the number of applicants inevitably would decline as well. Of course, 
these results could be obtained more directly by adopting the proposal that the Social 
Security Advisory Board has long made to assign agency lawyers to represent the 
government in disability hearings.63   
                                                 
62 U.S. Social Security Administration, Fee Agreements, 
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/fee_agreements.html. 
63 Social Security Advisory Board, Charting the Future of Social Security’s Disability Programs: The Need 
for Fundamental Change 19-20 (2001).  
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I am sure that both the Bar and my students would appreciate the effects of this 
proposal in improving employment opportunities for lawyers. It has a potentially fatal 
cost, however. Converting a high proportion of disability cases before ALJs into hard-
fought adversarial proceedings undoubtedly would increase the average amount of time 
required to conduct each hearing. That, in turn, would reduce the number of cases each 
ALJ could decide, thereby increasing the waiting time for a hearing. Delay in the 
availability of ALJ hearings has long been one of the major problems in the disability 
decisionmaking process. That problem has increased in recent years as a result of the 
enormous increase in applications filed and hearings requested. The average waiting 
period in 2007 was 512 days.64 It is difficult to support a proposal that responds to one 
major problem—excessive generosity in the decisionmaking process—by exacerbating 
another major problem—undue delay in that process. 
 
B. Require SSA review of past decisions to grant benefits    
 
The United Kingdom is considering another potential solution—mandatory 
periodic review of all past decisions to grant disability benefits.65 Some sort of review 
process should be part of the US solution to the problem. SSA has engaged in review of 
past awards during some periods of time, with impressive results. SSA recovered $11 in 
benefits that otherwise would have been paid to undeserving individuals for every $1 it 
                                                 
64 SSA OIG, Congressional Response Report: Hearing Office Disposition Rates (A-07-10-21015), January 
2010.  http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.html 
65 Department for Work and Pensions, Disability Living Allowance Reform, page 4, 11 (December 2010), 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/dla-reform-consultation.pdf. 
 13
spent engaging in review of prior awards.66 During the period 1980-83, SSA reviewed a 
large number of prior awards. SSA found that 40% of the beneficiaries whose cases it 
reviewed were not disabled.67 SSA’s review programs have elicited strong pushback 
from courts, advocates for the disabled, and politicians, however.68 In recent years, SSA 
has largely abandoned its review programs.69 It has allocated virtually all of its scarce 
decisionmaking resources to an understandable effort to reduce the delays in the process 
of deciding whether to grant benefits.70 Thus, SSA must be able to identify some new 
source of resources to fund a review program. 
 
C. Implement SSA quality controls on ALJs 
 
SSA could attempt to address the problem by reinstituting some version of the 
ALJ quality control programs it implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s. During that 
period, SSA responded to the problem of delay in the ALJ decisionmaking process by 
announcing productivity goals for ALJs and it responded to the problems of 
inconsistency and excessive generosity in ALJ decisionmaking by announcing a 
presumptive range of decisions to grant benefits.71 That program elicited strong pushback 
from courts and from ALJs.  
                                                 
66 U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Audit’s Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Work Plan, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/audittxt/workplan2010.html. 
67 Autor & Duggan, note 4, supra. , at 78. 
68 E.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983); Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Finnegan v. Mathews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) 
69 69  U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, 
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, (July 2004), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04656.pdf. 
70Id.  
71 The programs are described in Pierce, note 26, at 503-10. 
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After several district courts held that the program was an unlawful interference 
with the decisional independence of ALJs,72 the Second Circuit issued an ambiguous 
opinion in which it seemed to uphold parts of the program.73 The court recognized that: 
“policies designed to insure a reasonable degree of uniformity among ALJ decisions are 
not only within the bounds of legitimate agency supervision but are to be encouraged.”74 
The court expressed “concern,” however, that the presumptively permissible range of 
grants of benefits the agency had announced would put pressure on ALJs to deny benefits 
in some cases.75 The court characterized such an effect as “a clear infringement of 
decisional independence.”76 The court approved of SSA’s “reasonable efforts to increase 
the production levels of ALJs”, with the caveat that SSA could only establish reasonable 
goals and not unreasonable quotas. 
The Second Circuit’s ambivalent attitude toward the presumptive range of grant 
decisions SSA had announced, coupled with several district court opinions that 
excoriated SSA for announcing the presumptive range of grant decisions, undoubtedly 
contributed to the agency’s decision to reconsider its program. SSA soon discovered, 
however, that the entire program, including the productivity measures the Second Circuit 
approved, was toothless. 
SSA identified one ALJ who had consistently fallen below the minimum level of 
productivity that the Second Circuit seemed to have approved. SSA provided that ALJ 
with additional training and warned him that SSA would remove him for good cause if he 
                                                 
72 E.g., Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1055, 1073 (W.D. Va. 1986); Association of Administrative 
Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141-43 (D.D.C. 1984).  
73 Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989). 
74 Id. at 680. 
75 Id. at 681. 
76 Id. at 681. 
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did not improve his productivity.77 When the ALJ had not improved his productivity two 
and one-half years later, SSA filed a petition with MSPB to remove the ALJ for good 
cause. MSPB refused on the basis that SSA had not established good cause to remove the 
ALJ.78 
MSPB’s unwillingness to help SSA implement its program to improve ALJ 
productivity explains SSA’s decision not even to attempt to enlist MSPB’s assistance in 
implementing its more controversial effort to establish a presumptively acceptable range 
of favorable and unfavorable decisions and SSA’s ultimate decision to abandon that 
effort.   Given the reaction of both the judiciary and MSPB to SSA’s past efforts to 
exercise some degree of control over its ALJs, SSA would have a reasonable prospect of 
success in a new effort of this type only if it took a new approach. SSA and MSPB could 
conduct a joint rulemaking to issue a rule that would simultaneously identify a 
presumptively permissible range of decisions to grant disability benefits and adopt an 
interpretation of “good cause” that authorizes SSA and MSPB to remove or to otherwise 
discipline an ALJ for deviating from the presumptively permissible range of decisions 
without an adequate explanation. 
The rule would have to be issued jointly by the two agencies because SSA has 
exclusive power to issue rules applicable to the disability program79 while MSPB has 
exclusive power to issue rules that define “good cause” for purposes of the statutory 
provision that authorizes MSPB to remove an ALJ for good cause.80 If the agencies 
                                                 
77 SSA v. Goodman, 58 Admin. L. 2d (Pike & Fisher) 780, 787 (MSPB 1984).  
78 Id. at 789. 
79 See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983). 
80 See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953); Long v. SSA, 635 F.3d at 
534-35. 
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provided good reasons supported by solid evidence, they would have a good chance of 
persuading a court to uphold such a rule.81 
 
D. Eliminate nonexertional restrictions as a potential disability 
 
 There is broad agreement that the problem of excessive ALJ grants of disability 
benefits began as a result of the 196782 and 198483 amendments to the Social Security 
Act that had the effect of broadening the category of impairments that can potentially be 
the basis for a determination that an applicant is permanently disabled.84 Most of the 
dubious grants of benefits by ALJs are attributable to findings that an applicant suffers 
from nonexertional restrictions, such as mental illness or pain, that are so severe that he 
cannot perform the functions of any job available in the US economy.85 It follows that we 
could eliminate the problem simply by amending the statute to eliminate nonexertional 
restrictions as a potential qualifying impairment. 
 Such a statutory change would have a major disadvantage, however. It would 
sweep too broadly. There undoubtedly are individuals with mental illnesses and/or pain 
so severe that it is truly disabling. We should not exclude all such individuals from 
potential eligibility if we can identify another viable means of addressing the problem of 
excessive awards to individuals who suffer from less severe mental illness and/or pain. 
 
                                                 
81 Chevron deference would apply to the agencies’ interpretations of their respective statutes. See Richard 
Pierce, I Administrative Law Treatise §3.5 (5th ed. 2010).  
82 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, codified at 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). 
83 Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, codified at 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(5). 
84 See Autor & Duggan, supra. note 4, at 77-78; Dubin, supra. note 18, at 948-50; Pierce, supra. note 26, at 
509-13.  
85 Text at notes 18-24 supra. 
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E. Eliminate the right to appeal to an ALJ 
 
 Finally, we could eliminate completely the right to appeal a denial of disability 
benefits to an ALJ. The right to appeal to an ALJ is predicated on the belief that an ALJ 
decision based on an oral hearing is more likely to yield accurate findings than two 
bureaucratic decisions based on paper hearings, i.e., consideration of written submissions 
from the applicant and his supporters and from a variety of medical professionals. There 
is no evidence to support that belief. There are instead many reasons to believe that two 
independent decisions based on paper hearings are more likely to yield accurate findings 
than an ALJ decision based on an oral hearing.86 
 The belief that ALJ decisions are more accurate than bureaucratic decisions 
necessarily is based on some combination of two subsidiary beliefs—that oral hearings 
are likely to result in more accurate findings than paper hearings and that ALJs are more 
likely to be unbiased decisionmakers because of their independence from the 
bureaucracy. Neither of those beliefs is justified. 
 Making ALJs independent of the agencies that employ them eliminates one 
potential source of bias, but it simultaneously increases ALJs’ vulnerability to other 
sources of bias. SSA ALJs are located in regional offices. Thus, they decide whether their 
neighbors are entitled to disability benefits at taxpayer expense. An ALJ can become very 
popular in the community in which he doles out billions of dollars to applicants for 
benefits. The desire to be popular in your community can be a powerful source of bias in 
the SSA disability decisionmaking process. The natural desire to be popular undoubtedly 
helps to explain the pattern of decisions of the ALJ who granted benefits in 729 of 729 
                                                 
86 Text at notes 18-39 supra. 
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cases in the first half of 2011 and 1280 of 1284 cases in 2010, at a cost to taxpayers of 
$492,205,000 in only 18 months.87 By all accounts, that ALJ relishes his status as one of 
the most popular people in his city and county.88 It is fair to infer that the over 100 ALJs 
who grant benefits in over 90% of cases are affected by the same source of bias.89  
Of course, an ALJ who is independent of and, hence, beyond the control of, the 
agency that employs him, is unusually vulnerable to other potential sources of bias as 
well. Thus, for instance, it is impossible to describe the pattern of decisions of one of the 
two ALJs at the Commodities Future Trade Commission as unbiased. That ALJ has never 
decided a case in favor of an investor, thus demonstrating beyond any doubt his bias 
against investors.90 
The other basis for the belief that oral hearings yield more accurate findings is the 
widespread assumption that the opportunity of the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of 
witnesses is an aid to accurate fact-finding. Like the assumption that independence from 
the government eliminates bias, this assumption is contradicted by a large body of 
evidence. Numerous studies have found that ability to observe the demeanor of witness is 
a distraction from the process of finding facts that detracts from the accuracy of the 
process, rather than an aid to fact finding that improves accuracy.91 
I accept the findings of social scientists that applicants for benefits value the 
opportunity for an oral hearing before an ALJ even if the ALJ decides not to grant the 
                                                 
87 Text at notes 39-42 supra. 
88 See Paletta, note 40, supra.  
89 Text at notes 28-32 supra. 
90 Michael Schroeder, If You’ve Got a Beef With a Futures Broker, This Judge Isn’t for You—in Eight 
Years at the CFTC, Levine Has Never Ruled for an Investor, Wall Street Journal (Dec. 13, 2000).    
91 Sources cited in note 39 supra. 
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requested benefits.92 I do not believe, however, that we can afford the massive costs of 
oral hearings before ALJs merely to assist applicants for benefits in their efforts to accept 
a negative decision. The direct costs of the ALJ decisionmaking process, in the form of 
the salary and benefits paid to ALJs is well over $2 billion per year.93 The direct costs of 
ALJs are dwarfed by their indirect costs, in the form of scores of billions of dollars paid 
to undeserving applicants for benefits.94 
We could save scores of billions by removing all of the ALJs who now decide 
appeals from SSA decisions that deny disability benefits. In 1953 the Supreme Court held 
that removal of a class of ALJs on the basis of a determination that they are no longer 
needed or are no longer affordable satisfies the statutory good cause prerequisite for 
removal.95 We could then use the over $2 billion dollars in personell cost savings to fund 
and staff the sorely needed program to review prior awards of benefits to terminate 
benefits that are now being paid to many thousands of beneficiaries who do not actually 
satisfy the standard of disability in the Social Security Act.96 Based on prior experience, 
that program would yield returns of eleven dollars for every one dollar we invest in it.97  
Elimination of the 1400 SSA ALJs would also produce another major benefit to 
SSA. As Justice (then-professor) Scalia documented in 1979, ALJs impose large costs of 
two types on agencies.98 First, they typically have the highest salaries in the agency.99 
Second, they occupy a high proportion (24% to 73%) of the Senior Executive Service 
                                                 
92 See, e.g., John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, Stephen Latour & Pauline Holden, Procedural Justice As 
Fairness, 76 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 1280-86 (1974). See also Verkuil et al, supra. note 37, at 132-33.  
93 ALJ salaries vary from $103,900 to 155,500. US Office Of Personell Management Salary Table No. 
2011-ALJ. Non-cash benefits add at least 30% to that number.     
94 Text at notes 9-39 supra. 
95 Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 140-43 (1953). 
96 Text at 63-68 supra. 
97 Sources cited in notes 66-67 supra.  
98 Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 57 (1979). 
99 Id. at 69-70. 
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(SES) positions available at an agency.100 The removal of ALJs from SSA would allow 
SSA to hire a large number of talented people to manage its important programs by 
freeing up a large number of SES positions for that purpose. As Justice Scalia put it, the 
decision to allocate a massive proportion of an agency’s personell budget and SES 
positions to ALJs “represents the triumph of the courtroom mystique over reason.”101 
A correllary change should accompany the elimination of ALJs from the 
disability decisionmaking process. District judges should be instructed to review SSA 
decisions as final decisions based solely on the record created at the agency. At present, 
district judges are required to permit applicants who appeal a decision denying benefits to 
obtain a remand to SSA to allow the applicant to introduce new evidence.102 That is not 
the way other agency review proceedings are conducted.103 The norm in other contexts is 
judicial review based solely on the record before the agency.104 
I anticipate that some people will argue that implementation of my proposal 
would violate due process. In Mathews v. Eldridge,105 the Supreme Court upheld the 
SSA’s sole reliance on paper hearings to terminate disability benefits based on an agency 
finding that a beneficiary is not disabled. The Court made that decision, however, in the 
context of a decisionmaking process in which SSA made available to anyone who 
disagreed with such a determination a post-termination oral evidentiary hearing before an 
ALJ.106 Thus, it would be fair to say that the Eldridge opinion gave rise to a permissible 
inference that the Court would have required SSA to provide a dissatisfied applicant for 
                                                 
100 Id. at 70-71. 
101 Id. at 71. 
102 42 U.S.C. §205(g).  
103 Mashaw et al, supra. note 20, at 130-36. 
104 Pierce, supra. note 81, at §11.6. 
105 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
106 Id. at 339-42. 
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disability benefits the opportunity for an oral evidentiary hearing at some time before or 
within a reasonable period after SSA makes an initial decision that denies or terminates 
benefits. 
It is highly unlikely that the Court would convert that permissible inference into a 
holding today, however, for several reasons. First, the reasoning in Eldridge supports the 
holding in Eldridge and not the inference some read into Eldridge. The Court reasoned 
that SSA could resolve the kinds of factual disputes that arise in disability disputes with 
tolerable accuracy based on a paper hearing in which agency officials rely exclusively on 
written submissions from applicants and doctors.107 The Court expressed the view that it 
was not important for the fact finder to be able to observe the demeanor of witnesses in 
making this class of decisions.108 
Second, as I have documented at length elsewhere, the vast majority of federal 
agencies have replaced oral hearings with written hearings in the context of many types 
of agency adjudications over the decades since the Court issued its opinion in 
Eldridge.109 Some courts initially balked at that dramatic change in the procedures 
agencies use to adjudicate disputes, but every circuit has now indicated its approval of 
that change in many contexts.110 To paraphrase Justice Scalia, agencies and courts 
gradually have allowed reason to triumph over the courtroom mystique.111 Replacing oral 
hearings with paper hearings in the context of SSA disability decisions would just be 
                                                 
107 Id. at 344-48. See also Paul Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication, 43 U.Chi. L. Rev. 739, 775-96 
(1976) (finding that most agencies provide only notice, an unbiased decisionmaker,  and an explanation for 
each decision the agency makes in an adjudicatory proceeding and explaining why that combination of 
procedural safeguards satisfies due process in most contexts.       
108 Id. at 344-48. 
109 Pierce, supra. note 81 at §8.2. 
110 See Jack Beerman & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856, 875-80 
(2007).   
111 See Scalia, note 98 supra., at 71.  
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another logical step down a road that many agencies and courts have taken with excellent 
results. 
 
The Present System Is Unconstitutional 
    
Third, any court that confronts a constitutional challenge to the changes I urge 
should be influenced by its recognition that the present method of SSA disability 
decisionmaking is clearly unconstitutional. That conclusion flows inevitably from several 
characteristic of the present process. First, ALJs make final decisions to grant disability 
benefits.112 Second, SSA ALJs are employed by SSA, which, in turn, is an independent 
agency headed by a Commissioner who serves a six-year term and who can only be 
removed by the President for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”113 Third, ALJs 
can be removed only by the MSPB and only for “good cause.”114 Fourth, the MSPB is an 
independent agency headed by three members who serve seven-year terms and who can 
be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”115  
Each of those characteristics has important legal consequences. Because ALJs 
make final decisions to grant benefits, they are “officers of the United States” rather than 
employees. In Landry v. FDIC,116 the D.C. Circuit resolved a dispute with respect to the 
legal status of ALJs who work at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The 
                                                 
112 Text at notes 16-17 supra.  
113 42 U.S.C. §902 (a)(3).  
114 5 U.S.C. §7521.  
115 5 U.S.C. §1202. 
116 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
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petitioner argued that he had been the subject of an unlawful decision because the ALJ 
who issued an initial decision adverse to the petitioner was an “officer of the United 
States” who had not been appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments 
Clause.117 The court held, two-to one, that FDIC ALJs are employees, rather than 
officers.118  
The dissenting judge expressed the view that FDIC ALJs are officers.119 The 
majority based its disagreement with that conclusion exclusively on one characteristic of 
the FDIC decisionmaking process. Like most agencies, FDIC’s rules authorize an ALJ 
only to make an “initial decision.”120 The FDIC rules empower the agency to substitute 
its opinion, including its findings of fact, for the initial decision of an ALJ.121 The 
majority concluded that the lack of the power to make a final decision was “critical” to its 
decision that FDIC ALJs are employees rather than officers.122 The majority made it 
clear that it would agree with the dissenting judge if FDIC ALJs had the power to make 
final decisions.123 SSA’s rules allow an appeal of an ALJ decision to a higher authority in 
the agency only at the behest of an applicant whose application for benefits has been 
denied by an ALJ. ALJ decisions that grant benefits are final. They are not reviewable by 
any institution of government. Thus, it is clear that SSA ALJs are “officers” as that term 
is used in the constitution. 
                                                 
117 Id. at 1128. 
118 Id. at 1134. 
119 Id. at 1140. 
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121 Id. at 1133. 
122 Id. at 1134. 
123 Id. at 1133-34. 
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The holding in the Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Board (PCAOB)124 applies directly to SSA ALJs. In 
PCAOB, the Court held unconstitutional the statutory limit on the power of the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to remove members of the Board because of what the 
Court assumed to be the statutory limits on the President’s power to remove SEC 
members. As the Court framed the question before it: 
The question is whether these separate layers of protection may be combined. 
May the President be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is 
in turn, restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even though that 
inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United States? 
We hold that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to 
Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.125 
The Court then explained its holding:   
This novel structure does not merely add to the Board’s independence, but 
transforms it. Neither the President nor anyone who is directly responsible to him, 
nor even an officer whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has full 
control over the Board. The President is stripped of the power our precedents have 
preserved, and his ability to execute the laws -- by holding his subordinates 
accountable for their conduct—is impaired. 
That arrangement is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power 
in the President.126 
                                                 
124 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010). 
125 Id. at 3147. 
126 Id. at 3154. 
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 The unconstitutionality of the multiple layers of insulation of SSA ALJs from the 
President follows a fortiori from the holding and reasoning in PCAOB.  Indeed, SSA 
ALJs may even be “principal officers,” rather than “inferior officers.” To be an “inferior 
officer,” an officer must be inferior to someone. The Court has used two criteria to decide 
whether an officer is an inferior to a principal officer—the extent of the principal 
officer’s ability to overrule the officer’s decisions and the extent of the principal officer’s 
ability to remove the officer.127 In theory, SSA ALJs work for the Social Security 
Commissioner. The Commissioner has not attempted to overrule an ALJ decision to grant 
disability benefits in decades, however, and he lacks the resources needed to review more 
than a tiny fraction of such decisions even if he were to decide to devote some of the 
agency’s scarce resources to that task. The Commissioner has no power to remove an 
ALJ for any reason. Incredibly, the Commissioner is forbidden even to evaluate the 
performance of ALJs.128 The Commissioner’s only relevant power is the power to 
petition the MSPB to remove an ALJ for “good cause.” That is far short of the powers 
that the Court requires a principal officer to have with respect to another officer in order 
to render the other officer “inferior” to the principal officer. 
 SSA ALJs are insulated from presidential control by three layers of restrictions on 
the President’s power over the executive branch. An SSA ALJ can only be removed by 
MPSB for “good cause” in response to a petition for removal filed by SSA. An MSPB 
member can only be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.” The Social Security Commissioner can only be removed by the 
President for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Since SSA ALJs are officers of 
                                                 
127 The Court discussed and applied those criteria in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-66 
(1997). 
128 Verkuil, et al, supra. note 37, at 152-62. 
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the United States, there is no doubt that the three layers of removal limits that insulate 
SSA ALJs from presidential control are unconstitutional.129 
 I expect that the ALJ who was suspended by the Commissioner in the wake of the 
Wall Street Journal article exposing him as a judge who decides all cases in favor of 
applicants will seek review of the Commissioner’s action in court. If so, that case will 
provide an ideal vehicle for a judicial opinion that holds the statutory limits on the power 
to remove SSA ALJs unconstitutional. Indeed, that is the only means through which the 
Commissioner can attempt to defend his decision to suspend the ALJ, since he is 
prohibited by statute from taking any action against an ALJ, specifically including 
suspension.  
Conclusion 
 SSA ALJs are responsible for about 2 per cent of total federal spending in 2011 
budget – an amount equivalent to 6 per cent of the 2011 budget deficit.130 Yet, they are 
accountable to no one. As a result of this blatantly unconstitutional allocation of power, 
some SSA ALJs are engaging in unprecedented binge spending while the President and 
Congress are desperately attempting to identify and to implement the massive spending 
                                                 
129 In a thoughtful article, retired ALJ Jerome Nelson has relied on dicta in the PCAOB opinion to support 
his contention that the statutory limits on the power of independent agencies to remove ALJs are not 
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cuts in virtually all other parts of the budget that are essential to restore a sustainable 
fiscal policy for the nation. 
 There are several ways in which we can attempt to address this problem. My 
preferred solution would be to abolish the ALJ-administered part of the disability 
decisionmaking process and to use at least part of the resulting savings to implement a 
system of reviewing past decisions to grant disability benefits to determine whether each 
beneficiary actually suffers from a permanent disability so serious that he can not 
perform the functions needed to hold any job in the US economy.                                                                     
